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CURRENT DECISIONS
Admiralty-APLICABILITY OF THE JONES ACT TO FoRluGN SEAMEN
AN FoRiGNm SHIPOWNERS. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 90 S.Ct. 1731
(1970).
The plaintiff was a Greek seaman injured in the port of New Orleans
aboard a Greek flag vessel, owned by a Greek corporation. He brought
suit under the Jones Act, and the district court rendered judgment in
his favor.1 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed.
In affirming the lower courts' decisions, 3 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the test enunciated in Lauritzen v. Larse for
determining if a shipowner should be held to be an employer for Jones
Act purposes is not to be applied strictly.5 Rather, the factors stated in
Lauritzen are to be considered in light of the promotion of the national
interest.6
Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920,1 commonly
called the Jones Act, permits a seaman injured in the course of his em-
ployment to maintain an action for damages at law against his employer
with a right of trial by jury." From a literal reading of its terms, the Act
seems to indicate it applies to "any seaman". 9 Such an interpretation
could mean that "a hand on a Chinese junk, never outside Chinese waters,
1. Rhoditis v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 273 F. Supp. 248 (SD. Ala. 1967).
2. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
3. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 90 S. Ct. 1731 (1970).
4. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). See Annot., 97 L.Ed. 1274 (1953); Annor., 84 A.L.R.2d 906
(1962); H. BAEm, AmUmlRALTY LAW OF T-m SuPRExm CouRT 59 (1963).
5. 90 S. Ct. at 1734. Lauritzen recognized that the enumerated factors are conceded
to only "influence" the choice of law which will govern a maritime tort claim. 345
U.S. 571, 583 (1953).
6. 90 S. Ct. at 1734.
7. 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1964):
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply.... Jurisdiction
in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
8. See 2 M. Nopms, TBm LAw oF SEAMAN 787 (2d ed. 1962).
9. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576 (1953).
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would not be beyond its literal wording." 1o However, the Court in its
consideration of the Jones Act in Lauritzen found as a matter of statu-
tory construction that it applies only to areas in which American law
would be considered operative under doctrines of international law."
This theory of construction is in accord with Chief Justice Marshall's
statement that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." 12
Assuming that a person at the time of his injury is employed as a sea-
man,13 a question arises as to whether he is protected by the Jones Act
if he is an alien, or was injured aboard a foreign ship, or was hired by a
foreign employer. The Court in Lauritzen'4 attempted to formulate gen-
eral principles which would apply in these situations, in addition to re-
lated choice of law problems.' 5 The test consists of a court determina-
tion concerning the weight and significance to be given seven factors:
"(1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the
allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) allegiance of the de-
fendant shipowner; (5) the place where the contract of employment
was made; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law
of the forum." ", These factors were to be accorded different weights
with the "law of the flag" receiving greatest stress while the "place of
the wrongful act" was to receive the least.' 7
The intended flexibility of the Lauritzen test was stifled in subsequent
cases where courts applied it as a rigid rule of thumb.' s The result-
ing confusion caused some courts to search for an alternative, usually
10. Id. at 577.
11. Id.
12. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
13. Another question often faced by courts involves the kind of work done by a
person claiming to be a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act. See Annot.,
75 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1961).
14. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
15. See 44 TuL. L. REv. 347 (1970).
16. 90 S. Ct. at 1733, discussing the Lauritzen criteria set out in 345 U.S. at 583-92.
17. 345 U.S. at 583-91.
18. 44 Tu.. L. REv. 347, 348 (1970). For cases which have relied heavily on "the
law of the flag" see Samaras v. The S.S. Jacob Verolme, 187 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa.
1960); Hansen v. A.S.D. S.S. v. Endborg, 155 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (absent
"'special circumstances" the law of the flag prevails); Nakken v. Fearnley & Eger, 137
F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Jonassen v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 862 (E.D.N.Y.
1952); Catherall v. Cunard S.S. Co., 101 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Some courts
have "looked past the law of the flag" where it appears that the foreign flag is merely
illusory and the ship is controlled by U. S. domiciliaries. Southern Cross S.S. Co. v.
Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
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with no success.' 9 The problem of the varied and usually strict applica-
tions of Lauritzen was highlighted by the decision in Tsakonites v. Trans-
pacific Carriers Corp.2 ° which, on facts similar to the instant case, held
the Jones Act inapplicable.21
In light of the remedial purpose of the Jones Act, the need was ap-
parent for the Supreme Court to reinterpret the test esposed in Lauritzen.
In Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,22 the Court recognized the pitfalls in-
herent in a mechanical application of the Lauritzen test.23 The Court
emphasized the need for weighing the seven factors in Lauritzen in
light of the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act judisdic-
tion.24 It placed its emphasis on the fact that the ship involved, the Hel-
lenic Hero, as well as many of defendant's other ships, where not casual
visitors to the United States ports.-' The defendant's ships were earning
income from cargo originating or terminating in the United States. Thus
the Court indicated that the shipowner's base of operation is another sig-
nificant factor in a court determination of the Jones Act's application.26
But Hellenic Lines most importantly holds that the factors enunciated in
19. E.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
deded, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
20. 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cit. 1966).
21. Id. at 429. But see 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1761 (1967).
22. 90 S. Ct. 1731 (1970).
23. Id. at 1734.
24. Id. The Court cites Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 441
(2d Cir. 1959) where Judge Medina said:
... the decisional process of arriving at a conclusion on the subject
of the application of the Jones Act involves the ascertainment of the
facts or groups of facts which constitute contacts between the transaction
involved in the case and the United States . . . . [Elach factor is to be
"weighed" and "evaluated" only to the end that, after each factor has
been given consideration, a rational and satisfactory conclusion may be
arrived at on the question of whether all the factors present add up to
the necessary substantiality. Moreover, each factor, or contact, or group
of facts must be tested in the light of the underlying objective, which is
to effectuate the liberal purposes of the Jones Act.
25. 90 S. Ct. at 1734.
26. Id. The dissent believes that the decision relies on the fact that Hellenic Lines is
an American based operation and its vessels would have a competitive advantage over
American-flag vessels were the United States to permit the foreign shipowner to avoid
responsibility under the Jones Act. The dissent argues that "liability is only one
factor that contributes to the higher cost of operating an American-flag vessel,"
and therefore should not be regarded as a reason for extending Jones Act recovery
to foreign seamen "when the underlying concern of the legislation before us is the
adjustment of the risk of loss between individuals and not the regulation of commerce
or competition." Id. at 1738.
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Lauritzen are not to be construed as exhaustive.17 The result would ap-
pear to be that future courts, since they will be allowed to consider ad-
ditional factors under the Hellenic Lines rationale, will move toward a
broadened application of the Jones Act.
JOHN A. SCANELLI
Admiralty-WRoNGFuL DEATH. Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
The surviving widow of a longshoreman killed while working aboard
the Palmetto State on navigable waters within the state of Florida
brought a wrongful death action against the shipowner, States Marine
Lines, Inc., claiming unseaworthiness of the vessel.' The district court
and the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's complaint on the grounds
that general maritime law did not support a death action, and that unsea-
worthiness was not a basis of liability under the Florida statute.2 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that wrongful death
based on unseaworthiness is maintainable under the authority of "general
maritime law." 3 The Court reasoned that maritime law has always been
a separate body of jurisprudence, administered by different courts, with
components of civil law and common law. To insure uniform applica-
tion, maritime law should not be dependent upon either state law or
common law.
27. Id. at 1734.
1. Petitioner initially brought suit in a Florida state court (not reported) from
which the case was removed to the federal District Court for the Middle District of
Florida on diversity grounds. The district court dismissed the unseaworthiness count
(not reported) and the widow appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit certified a stipulated question whether unseaworthiness is within the
contemplation of Florida's wrongful death statute to the Florida Supreme Court. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1965) (certification procedure). Following a negative
answer to the certified question, 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968), the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's dismissal. 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1965).
3. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970). General maritime law
is a curious blend of bits and pieces gathered from various legal systems. It is a general
and rather vague set of principles that have validity in a nation only to the extent that
the nation accepts and implements them through its courts or legislation. See, e.g.,
Southern Pacific R.R. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916); The Lottawana, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
558, 572, 574 (1874). "To ascertain, therefore, what the maritime law of this country
is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian and other foreign works on
the subject, or the codes which they have framed; but we must have regard to our
own legal history, constitution, legislation, usages and adjudications as well." 88 U.S. at
576.
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